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EQUILIBRIUM IN SPATIAL VOTING: 
THE MEDIAN VOTER RESULT IS AN ARTIFACT 
Melvin J. Hinich 
Virginia Polyte chni c Institute and St at e Uni versi ty 
The multidimensional spatial theor y of electoral competition 
introdu ced by Davis and Hinich has r ecei ved considerable scholarly
interest in recent years.
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The theory, whi ch is a. fo rma lized ext ensi on 
of the pione eri ng efforts of Black [3] and Downs [9], res ts on tw o key 
assumptions: 1) voters share a common coherent per ceptual spatial 
framework for candidates, and 2) the ilndifference contours of a voter's 
utility fun ction are ellipsoids. As a consequence a vo t e r ' s ideal 
(bliss) poin t is an interior point in the spa ce. If all the ellipsoidal 
indifferen�e cont ou rs are si milar , these assumptions i mply that choice 
can be rationalized by simple Eu clidean distance. In a more general 
spatial model, weig h ts on the dimensions of the space vary in the
population. 
The d imensi ons are des cr ibed as salient political issues in 
previous expositions of the theory, but it is more consistent with 
empirical studies of voter attitudes to conceive of the d imen sions as 
heuristic factors whi ch are used by a voter oo fore cast a candidate's 
behavior with respe ct to e conomi c and so cial poli cy on ce e lec .t ed to
office. It is rational for a voter to simplify the evaluation process 
by reducing the complexity of the issue sp ace. Since the choice is over 
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representatives and not issues per se, a rational voter must forecast 
how a candidate will behave in office. It is reasonable to use past 
performance and past associations as a guide to a candidate's future 
behavior. Moreover most voters do not have much incentive to invest 
in information, given the small impact of a single vote and the 
infrequency of elections. Thus a simple rule of thumb based on 
inexpensive but noisy information is the best evaluation and choice 
strategy for most voters. For example, the political and social 
resolution of past civil rights conflicts has involved significant 
changes in the income and social environment for many nonwhites and certain 
white groups. As a result of many years of social conflict many white 
members of organized labor withdrew support from Humphrey in 1968 and 
especially McGovern in 1972 even though they believed that the Democratic 
Party supported their economic interests much more than the Republicans.
2 
Several empirical studies using new spatial mapping techni-
ques on data from the 1968 election survey, give rough support to 
mapping a position on a specific issue as a combination of economic 
and social factors, allowing for perceptual uncertainty and error. 3 
Returning to the theory, the major results deal with a two 
candidate election where each citizen votes for the candidate who is 
closest to his ideal point, and the winning candidate is the one who 
receives the most votes. When the voters have single peaked (quasi-
concave) utility functions, then the median voter position is a unique 
Nash equilibrium for the zero sum political game, assuming an odd 
number of distinct voters. When the median position is not unique, 
any median point is an equilibrium. The median voter result and its 
3 
social choice extension is the best known result in the theory.
4 
If there is more than one dimension, there is no pure strategy equilibrium 
unless the voter ideal points are radially symmetric. 5 For a multi-
dimensional space where mixed strategies for candidates are allowed, 
McKelvey and Ordeshook argue that even if cycles can exist, the candidate 
positions will be near the point those jth coordinate is the median 
of the distribution of the jth coordinates of the ideal points.
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These results are essentially deterministic and both voters 
and candidates have perfect information. Given the perceptual ambiguity 
of the basic dimensions, it is reasonable to allow some uncertainty in 
voter choice even if candidate positions are well-defined. If voters 
choose probabilistically as a function of their distances to the 
candidates, Hinich, Ledyard and Ordeshook present sufficient conditions 
for convergence to the mean ideal point by ��o candidates who seek to 
maximize their expected plurality. 
7 
The mean depends on the positions 
of extremists much more than the median, unless the distribution is 
symmetric. 
For an asymmetric unidimensional distribution the mean and 
the median can be nearly one standard deviation apart. It will be shown 
in this paper that in general, the median is not an equilibrium if there 
is an additive uncertainty element in the distance from voter to 
candidate in the one dimensional model. The median becomes the equili-
brium when all uncertainty is removed, resulting in a discontinuity in 
the choice rule. When uncertainty is present in the choice rule, the 
median is an equilibrium only for a special form of the utility function. 
Conditions for the mean position to be the political outcome are also 
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presented. The last section of this paper rationalizes the uncertainty 
term and voting in terms of private gains from voting for the winner. 
1. A Spatial Theory of Voting 
Using vector notation for points in t1, an n dimensional
Euclidean space, define the metric 
1 a 11A = [0'A0]
1/2
where A is a symmetric positive definite matrix. For each citizen c, 
define a generalized difference in distances to the candidates as 
follows: 
� (c) - a2(c) + M <llijJ-x(c) II A(c)) - M <II a- x(c) II A(c)) (1)
where M is a monotonically increasing function, and the ideal point 
x(c) and the matrix A(c) can vary among citizens. The parameter 
a.(c) > 0 represents the citizen's belief about the executive ability 
i -
of the candidate.8 When a candidate is virtually unknown, assume 
that his "a" is sufficiently negative to swamp the spatial term in (1) . 
In order to capture the information effect on a citizen's choice, 
assume that a. increases as the citizen becomes more aware of the i 
ith candidate's record in comparable positions. The voter prefers 
the candidate he believes will be more effective when elected, other 
factors being equal. 
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Suppose that citizens who have identical preferences have 
different values of al -a2. 
For each value of x and A, the
conditional cumulative distribution function of E = a1 -a2 is denoted
by FE, i . e . 
Pr {x votes for 0} FE [M (llijJ-xllA)- M (llO-x llA )] (2) 
is the aonditiona� probability that a voter whose ideal point is x
and whose matrix of dimension weights is A chooses candidate one.
The conditional probability that the voter chooses candidate two is 
just one minus the above probability. When all voters collapse their 
distribution of E around.a particular value £, then it follows 
from (2) that a voter chooses candidate one if 
_M(jlijJ-xliA - M<lle-xj� ) >£ 
and votes for candidate two if the unequality sign is reversed. The 
choice is indeterminate for equality, so assume for simplicity that 
the citizen abstains if equality holds. When E = 0, the 
choice rule yields the old spatial voting rule for any monotonic M --
vote for the closest candidate in the space (see Figure 1). 
When voters choose non-deterministically, the functional form 
of M matters, The two functions which conform to previous spatial 
models are 2 M(y) = y and M(y) =!Y I • It is simpler to compare these
two models when the space is unidimensional. For j ijJ -x I - I a -x I = 0 > 0' 
the conditional probability that a voter whose ideal point is x votes 
for a 
Pr {x votes for 0} FE (o2 + 2010-xl> (3) 
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from (2). This conditional probability is quasi-concave in I 8 -xi'
i.e. when 8 and W are a fixed distance apart with respect to a 
voter's ideal point, the probability that the voter chooses 8 
increases as 8 moves away from the ideal point, but with a diminishing 
rate. In other words, an extremist voter is more likely than a centrist 
to choose his closest alternative, given alternatives which are fixed 
distance apart in the center. The random component has a bigger effect 
on the choice function of voters who are more satisfied with the 
candidate positions than voters who are less satisfied; a not unreasonable 
behavioral property, but not a well established fact for voters. 
For the absolute value model, on the other hand, 
Pr {x votes for 8} Ft: ( cS) (4) 
for lw-xl I 8 ·-xi = o. This probability is obviously independent of 
8, which is a very special property of the absolute value model. In 
() F 
addition, the marginal probability � has a discontinuity and sign 
change at 8 = x for each w. provided that f c I w - xi) "' o where t: 
denotes the conditional density function of S given x and A.
f 
t: 
Before comparing these two models in terms of the majority rule policy 
positions, the objectives of the candidates have to be defined. 
2. Candidate Objective Functions 
Conceptualize the electorate as a random sample from an 
infinite population where N, the expected number of voters, is 
independent of 6 and W· Letting E denote the expectation with 
respect to the joint distribution of x and A for the voter 
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population, the plurality (vote difference) for 8 is given by 
¢1(8,w) = N{2EFt: (M (llw-xllA)- M (11 8- x  !IA ))- l}, (5) 
where ft:' the density of t:, is assumed to be continuous in order 
to simplify exposition. Recall that Ft: is the conditional probability 
that citizens with identical preference parameters vote for candidate 
one. 
In a two candidate election, the winner is the candidate who 
receives a majority of the votes �ast, i.e. a positive plurality. 
In the face of uncertainty about voter reactions, there are severai 
reasonable candidate objective functions which are consistent with 
h d f. . . f . . 9 t e e inition o winning. For this paper assume that a candidate 
attempts to maximize his expected plurality which is equivalent to 
maximizing expected vote since there are no rational abstainers. The 
candidates are in a zero sum continuous game which has a pure strategy 
equilibrium ·if ¢1 is continuous and quasi-concave in 8 and quasi-
convex in W for each (8 ,w) in a closed convex set in Rn .1:0 There are 
a variety of restrictions on the form of Ft: and the measure on the voter 
population which will imply the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. 
For a single issue dimension, it is easy to verify that the 
Downs result holds for the absolute value model M(y) = Jyl , i.e. both 
candidates choose the median ideal point since it is a Nash equilibrium 
in the zero-sum expected plurality (or equivalently, vote maximizing)
political game. When the space has more than one dimension, the 
deterministic restrictive symmetry conditions for equilibrium at the 
8 
mean holds for the absolute value model. It will now be shown for the 
quadratic model that if an equilibrium exists, it must be at the�· 
Consequently the unidimensional median voter result depends on the shape 
of the probability of voting function when voting is not a discontinuous 
deterministic function of the distances to the candidates. 
Theorem 1. Let D(x,e , 1/J) = 111/!- x II! - II e - x II!. and suppose that 
f (D(x,6,1/J)) > 0 with positive probability for all 6 and 1/! in Rn. 
E: 
Assume that an equilibrium exists to the zero-sum expected plurality 
political game. Then the equilibrium is unique and both candidates 
choose the point 
a. = [E{f (O)A})
-l 
E{f (O)Ax} • E: E: 
If fe:(O) 
is independent of x and A, as is the case when fE:(O) 
is constant in the population, then 
-1 
a. = [E(A)) E(Ax), (6) 
Consequently if x and A are uncorrelated, as is trivially the case 
when A is a constant, then a.= E(x), the mean ideal point. 
Proof: Suppose that 
* 8 and * 1/! are an equilibrium·strategy pair. 
Then they must satisfy the first order conditions 
Thus 
d l *  * d 2 *  * as 4 (8 , if! > = ""§if 4 <e , 1/! > = o 
( 
* * ) * 
Ef. D(x,8, 1/J) A (8 -x) 
E: 
0 
* * * 
Efe: (n(x,8, if! ))A (1/! �x) = o 
(7) 
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Since A is positive definite for each x and f8 (n (x,0
* , 1/!  *>) > 0, 
E f8 (n ( x, e
* 
,1/J*)) A is positive definite and thus is non-singular. It 
* * follows from (7) that 8 = 1/! ' * * and thus D (x, 8 , 1/J ) = 0. 
Now suppose f8(0) is independent of x and A. Then 
E f8(0 ? i!? a constant which can be divided out of both sides of the 
equation, and thus equation (6) holds. 
At equilibrium, the expected plurality to one is 
<jl
l(a.,
a.
) N [2 EF8 (O) - 1 ) (8) 
Suppose that F8(0) > 1/2 for each x and A, i.e. a2 < a1 for a 
majority of voters. Consequently 41(a.,a.) > 0 from (8); a victory 
for one. The assumption that FE (O) > 1/2 means that a majority of 
voters are more certain about candidate one than candidate two. In 
any case it is in the interest of a candidate to try to increase his 
"a" level in the population. Since candidates raise a great deal of 
their campaign contributions by supporting special interests, the 
quest for contributions will pull the candidates apart if the public 
goods positions of the candidates are perceived to be effected by 
their private bargains and the population preferences are asymmetric. 
Incorporating the effect of contributions into the game is best left 
for another paper. 
Although in general an equilibrium does not exist for the 
quadratic model, it will be shown that (a.,a.) is an equilibrium if 
f
8 
is a normal density whose mean is zero and whose variance 
is small. If, however, the mean of E: is positive, and thus 
2 
a 
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candidate one has a positive expected plurality, then candidate one 
can increase his plurality by moving away from a. 
Le mma . Suppose that for al l x and A, fs is a normal density 
centered at s = 0. If b oth candidates choose a, then neither 
candidate has an incentive to make a small move. This local 
equilibrium is unique. 
Proof: The res ult follows since ¢1 and ¢2 are locally concave in 
8 and ¢ r esp ecti vely at (a,a). 
Let f s be normal with mean zero and variance 
2 --
(J , and let 
1788¢
1 a2 1 denote the matrix 38. 38. ¢ Then 
1788¢
1 
1- J 
-2NE {fs (111/J-x II! - 118-xll ! ) rA
+ 2CJ
-2 (111/J-xll!-lie -xll !) AC8- x)(8-x)'AJ}
Thus when 8 = ijJ, 
'ilee¢
1 
= -2 NE {fs (O)A}' 
which is negative definite. Similar calculations show that 
is negative definite when 8 = ijJ. S ince 9 = 1jJ = a uni qu el y 
32 - - "'2 
31jJi31jJ
. 'l' 
J 
satisfies the first oLder conditions, the local concavity implies 
local stability at a. 
Now suppose that the mean of s is µ > 0. For simplicity 
let n=l and A=l. Then for 8=1jJ=a, 
32 - ¢1 
d 82 
. { -2 2 } -2NE f (O) [l-2CJ µ(a-x) ] . E: 
If µ=CJ and 0 is small, then 
_i_
 
¢1 ::: 
()82 
4N 
l21T 
-1 e -2 2 µ ax > O 
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(9) 
where 
2 2
CJ = E(a - x) • Thus (9) shows that candida te one will move x 
a way from a for this special case. 
When the mean of s is zero, and thus the candidates are 
syr.unetric with r espe ct to the non-spatial factors, then the equilibrium 
at (a, a) is globa l when a is pma ll . 
Theorem 2. Let p(x) denote the density function of the voter ideal 
points. Suppose that for all 
Rn, p(x) > 0 and p(x) = 0 
a normal E: whos e variance is 
xsX, a closed and bounded subset of 
for xix. For the quadratic model with 
CJ2• let 8*(0) denote the plurality 
maximizing position for candidate one when two chooses ijJ. As 0 -+ 0,
G*(cr) + ijJ. Thus whe n a is small, the mean x is a unique global 
equili bri um . 
Proof: Since this result is so counter intuitive, the proof will be 
given for the special case when n=l in order to simplify the 
exposition. The proof for n > 2 is straightforward using ordinary 
matrix algebra and some knowledge of the multi vari ate normal distri-
bution. 
Set 1jJ = 0 with no loss of generality. Since D(x ,8,0) 
28x- 82, 8* satisfies the first order condition 
1: 
· r=  -1 1 2 2 (8-x) (v.:1 0) exp [--2(28x-8) ]p(x)dx=O, 20 
(10) 
where p (x) 0 outside X. Since 
1 2 2 exp[- -2 (26x- e ) l 
4e2 e 2 exp[- -2 (x- 2) ], 20 20 
it then follows from (10) that if 6* f 0, 
E6* ( 6*- x) p(x) = o 
12 
(11) 
where EB* deno
tes the expectation with respect 
x whose mean is �* and variance is � 
46* 
to a normal density 
of Rewriting (11), 
e'� 
6* 
E6,�Cx- z-Yp(x) 
2= Ee*p(x) 
which yields the bound 
e *4 < 02
by the Schwarz inequality 
* 2 
Ee p (x) 
2 [Ee* p(x)] 
e* 2 6* 2 2 
[Ee* (x- Z) p (x)] :::_ Ee,., (x - -2 -) E6*p (x)
02-- E 2 
4e*2 e*P (x) 
(12) 
Now sup pose that e*(cJ) does not converge to 1jJ = 0 when 
cJ ->- o. Then there exists a sequence (Jk such that (Jk + 0 
and 
cJ 2 
8*(0k) ->- e f o. Thus the variance 
__ k__ 2 + 0, whic3. implies 
4(6*(0k)) 
e that E6*p(x) + p(z) and 
2 2 e Ee*P (x) + p ( 2 ) , as 0k + O. As a 
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result, the right hand side of (12) converges to zero, yielding a 
contradiction that 6 f O. This argument also shows that 6*(0) converg· 
to zero at least as fast as 0. 
Now suppose that 1jJ = a. From the above limit result, 0 
can be made sufficiently small so that 6* is in the concave region 
of ¢1 . about (a,a), and thus 1 1 <P (a,a) > <P (6*,a) . 
maximizes 1 <P (6 ,a) by definition, 6* = a and thus 
Since 6* 
(a,et) is an
equilibrium. The uniqueness follows from the uniqueness of the 
local stability. 
An intuitive explanation is in order for this result. First, 
it is easy to show why 6 ->-1/J when 0 = 0. If candidate two takes 
a position to the left of the median, candidate one maximizes his 
vote (and plurality) by taking a position just to the right of 1jJ 
(see Figure 2). When 0 is small, the two candidates end up at the 
mean rather than the median as a result of higher probability of 
the voters in the tails of p(x) voting for the candidate who is 
closer to them, as compared with the voters around the median. This 
difference between centrist and extremist voters is due to the 
quadratic (6 - x)2 in the choice function. The absolute value model 
yields the median as the equilibrium. A small amount of error in 
the choice rule is sufficient to destroy the generality and elegance 
of the Black-Downs unidimensional deterministic result. Unless the 
reader is willing to accept either the quadratic or the absolute 
value model, it is difficult to say anything about the outcome of 
majority rule voting using the spatial model with the uncertainty 
element in it. The quadratic has the advantage over the absol�te 
value model of generalizing the equilibrium to a multidimensional 
choice setting. 
3. Inform ation about the Location of the Mean 
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It is easy to write down assumptions about the distribution 
>f the ideal points, but it is another matter to estimate this 
i stribution from data which exists, or even hypothetical data which 
:ould be collected in principle. The Cahoon, et al. method using 
:andidate "feeling thermometer" scores to develop a spatial map of 
:andidates and voters has been referenced. Thermometer scores are 
gathered by as king individuals to respond on a 0°-to-100° scale how 
they feel to wards each of a set of candidates. Scores above 50° indicate 
a "warm" or favorable feeling, while scores less than 50° indicate to 
a "cold" feeling towards a candidate. A score of 50° is supposed to 
be an indication of being "lukewarm," but the data suggests some con-
founding with "dont' know. "  The major advantage of thermometer data 
over more in-depth interviewing is the speed of collection which results 
in a larger sample size. The noise in the thermometer scores which 
obscures individual voter preferences is overcome by averaging over a 
sample which is much larger than that which can be obtained by in-depth 
i ntervi ew ing at the same total cost. As long as there exists some 
common space for the electorate, pre cisio n of prediction can be 
obtained from a large sample of noisy data. Moreover the thermometer 
question taps the same reponse mechanism which candidates probe in 
speeches to a live audience. For example an enthusiastic response 
after a candidate's speech is related to a high average thermometer 
score in a survey. It will now be shown that a spatial model of 
thermometer scores can be used to find the mean ideal position even 
when qandidat�s do not know the distribution of ideal points for 
specific is sue s . 
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Suppose that the thermometer score for the ith candidate 
obtained from the kth re spo nde nt (k= 1, . ' N) is given by 
logTki = ski-II 
e
i - �II�+ Eki ' (13) 
where Eki 
is a zero mean noise term, and sk 
is an idiosyncratic 
parameter o"f no bas ic interest. Assume that � and '\c are uncorrelate: 
in the population. Thus the equilibrium is Cl = 0, where for simplicity 
the origin of the space has been shifted to make E(x) = 0. If �· 'it•
and Eki 
have finite variances,' then b y the central limit theorem the 
sample mean log Tki for large N is 
1 
log Tki = Ski- 8j_Ak8i - �'it�+ O(N-°2) (14) 
for each i, where the overbars denote averages over the random samp le 
of N r esponde nts . It then follows from (14) that for large N, the 
candidate' with the highest average log thermometer score is c loses t 
to the population mean id eal point. Moreover log Tki is a linear 
function of II El. 11 2 • Any move a ca nd idate can make which will increase 
i A 
his average log score is a move to wards the mean ideal point. A 
candidate does· not have to know where the mean ideal position is on 
various salient issues in order to move to the overall mean. As long 
as the aggregate feelings of voters to candidates is related to the 
spatial mode.l of utility, the mean ideal position can be at least 
roughly estimated from empirical observations of the re la tionship 
between is sue stands and high average responses. The quadratic 
spatial model co nnect s a local plurality equilibrium with popular 
acclaim. 
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The next section rationalizes voting in terms of a citizen's 
utility for political p articipation . 
4. Voting as an Act of Contribution 
The act of voting is the least expensive form of political 
participation for most people. Suppose that a voter contributes 
resources in order to change the utility he receives if his candidate 
wins, rather than acting to change the probability of winning, which is 
taken as given .
11 
For a large contributor, utility can be in the form 
of private benefits derived from his association with the candidate. 
For the small contributor, the utility is a personal satisfaction 
gained from giving up some resources to provide some support to a 
candidate. In this paper, voting and giving is connected by the 
assumption that voting is the lower limit of participation when the 
cost of voting and the voter budget constraint goes to zero. 
Suppose that a voter contributes r1 > 0 resource units to
candidate one and r2 > 0 to candidate two, where the voter's budget 
constraint is r � r1 + r2• It will now be shown that as the 
contribution budget goes to zero, the .citizen will contribute to at 
most one candidate, and thus the assumption that the voter can 
contribute to both candidates is made to allow hedging by the 
contributor without effecting the voting results when r approaches 
zero. 
Suppose that every potential voter, regardless of personal 
preferences, perceives the candidate positions as points 6 and �. 
respectively, in an n dimensional Euclidean space whose axes are 
17 
related to public goods issues . Let u
l (c , 6,rl) denote the net 
utility which citizen 
and one wins.
12 
Let 
c derives from having contributed r1 to one 
u
2
(c,�,r2) denote the net utility which the 
citizen derives from having contributed r2 to two and two wins. 
Writing 
1 
as a function of r1, but not implicit ly u (c,6,r1) r2 
assumes tha t if the voter contributes resources to both candidates, 
the contribution to � does not effect the utility derived from a 
contribution to 6. However the limiting result will be the same if 
a positive r2 has a negative effect on 
1 
u (c,6,r1) .  A similar 
assumption holds for 
2 
u • 
At the beginning of an election campaign there is considerable 
uncertainty about the preferences of the electorate, as well as their 
perceptions of the candida tes and issues. Formal and informal surveys 
help the candidates to estimate voter perceptions and preferences, but 
some uncertain.ty remains until the election results are in. As the 
campaign progresses the candidates and voters learn about each other, 
but the voters are not only uncertain about the outcome, they 
are uncertain about the willingness and the ability of either candidate 
to execute his stated or implied policy positions. At campaign ' s end 
the winner often can be accurately predicted using paired comparison 
polls, but the candidate positions are then highly constrained and mos t 
voters have made up their minds about the candidates and their chances 
of e,lection. 
Although the final outcome .is a function of the policy 
positions of the candidates and voter preferences according to the 
rationality paradigm, the dynamics of the electoral process involves 
18 
multilayered uncertainty relationships between voter behavior and 
final output. Suppose that each citizen has a subjective a priori 
value of p, the probability that candidate one wins. For a given 
value of p the expected net utility is
where 
U(c, 6, ijl, r1, r2) 
l 2 
pu (c, 6, rl) + qu (c, ijl, r2)' 
q = 1- p. If u is a strictly concave function of the 
contribution, then U is a strictly concave function of r1 and r2 
in a compact convex set and thusohas a unique maximum. The main 
reason for modeling voting in terms of contributions is to introduce 
the probability of winning into the voting decision. 
This model is best rationalized if voting is not secret. 
Since most ballots are secret, assume that a voter who is willing to 
consider the policy positions of both candidates gains in utility by 
voting for the winner or has a utility loss by voting for the loser. 
The changes in utility need only be infinitesimal for the result to 
hold. 
Not all citizens, however, are prepared to vote for either 
candidate depending on their policy positions. Define a partisan of 
candidate one, a citizen with 
() 1 
aru (c,6,0) > 0 for all 6.
() 2 
37u (c, ijl, O) < 0 for all 
Thus by the concavity of 
ijl, and 
2 
u in 
Cl 2 r2, h u (c,ijl,r2) < 0 for r2 > 0, and consequently this citizen will 
not contribute to or vote for candidate two regardless of his· policy 
positions. Since partisans have a fixed voting rule, they do not affect 
the strategy decisions of the candidates, and consequently can be 
ignored in the results dealing with equilibria. 
19 
Returning to the swing voter, if the expected net utility U 
* 
is maximized at a point r1 > 0,
conditions can be written 
a 1 
3ru (c,6,r1*) 
a 2 
a;-u (c,ijl, rz *) 
* 
r2 > O, then the first order 
q 
(15) 
p 
Theorem 3. As the budget constraint r + 0, the probability that a 
citizen gives to and votes for candidate 6 if and only if 
CJ 1 a 2 log """ u (c,6,0) - log ;:;- u (c,ijl,O) > log _g_ or or ·p 
where the marginal utilities are positive since the citizen is assumed 
to be a non-partisan voter. 
Proof: For fixed 6 and ijJ, let i !) ( r) 
* * 
a i 
-o-u . dr Suppose that r 
is sufficiently small so that r 2 = r - r1 (no saturation). Differ-
entiating (15)with re�pect to p, it follows from the concavity of 
. dr1 ui in r. that �d > 0. When p = p , i p 
P (r)
2 
n (O) 
1 2 
n (r) + n (O)
(16) 
the constraint is reached since - 1 - 2 Pll (r) = qn (0). Thus for all 
* * 
p .'.::. p, r1 = r and r2 = O. 
Moreover, as r decreases to zero, p(r) decreases since 
from (16 ), * > 0. In the limit, q(O)/p(O) is just n1(0)/n2Co) and
thus the result follows by taking logarithms. 
A citizen will abstain if Cl 1 ar u (c,8,0) < o 
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and 
and �r u2(c,w,O) < 0, i.e. the fixed cost of voting is greater than 
the expected benefits. In spatial models this form of abstention is 
called alienation. In sharp contrast to the Hinich, et al model, 
assume that aliena tion is independent of the 8 and w positions. 
The equilibrium results depend on the a priori distributions of 
in the population rather than the relationship of turnout to candidate 
positions. 
This voting theory can be related to the new spatial mo.del 
by assuming that for each 
Cl 1 
c, 
log ar u (c,8 , O)
2 
a+ a1(c) - I I 8-x(c) I� (17) 
and 
Cl 2 
log Clr u (c,w,O) a+ a2ce:> - 11 w
� x<c> 11! 
wh ere a is an arbitrary constant, and log -9... is added to p al - a2 
to define the E in Section 1. As long as voters have different 
beliefs abou t the election outcome, E '"" log } + a1 - a2 will vary in 
the population even if al= a2 for all citizens. In order, however, 
for Theorem 2 to still hold, the distribution of p given x and A 
must be symmetric about p = 1/2 since the mean of E must be zero. 
If in addition the utility is separable in 8 and r, the 
u tility is then proportional to exp [-11 8-x(c) II!] , which ,is quasi­
concave in e for each r. If e = � - :x, the marginal utility for 
voting for the winner is exp(a+ a1) U one wins and exp(a+ a2) if two 
wins. When both candidates adopt the same policy position, the voter 
prefers to support the candidate he anticipates will be more able 
in the job. The utility function is positive as a result of the 
separability and non-partisan assumptions. 
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In contrast t o  the old spatial model, A(c) is not defined up to 
a scalar multiple, but has elements whose units are defined by the 
units of the dimensions. The problem of.estimating the parameters 
of such a model when the units are unknown is discussed by Cahoon, et 
al., although there is no method developed as yet to relate even the 
mean ideal point to specific policy positions. 
4. Conclusion 
When the space is unidimensional, the median is a majority 
rule equilibrium when the probability of voting depends on the 
absolute value of the distance to the candidate from each voter. For 
the quadratic spatial model for voting, on the other hand, it has 
been shown that the mean ideal point is the only possibility for an 
equilibrium. When the error term in the spatial model is normal with 
mean zero, the mean is a local equilibrium, which becomes a global 
equilibrium when the variance is small. When the mean of the normal 
error is not zero, however, there is an asymmetry in the voter 
population which can upset the equilibrium at the mean. 
It is not surprising that candidates try to adopt centrist 
positions when the rule for winning is plurality. When candidate one 
gains a voter , his plurality over two increases by two votes, resulting in 
an incentive for the candidates to compete for voters whose ideal 
points are between the candidate p ositions (provided there are a 
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significant number of voters near the center). Majority rule produces 
outcomes near the mean as long as the bulk of the population is centrist. 
When conditions in the model support a global equilibrium 
at the mean, two candidate competition results in a predictable single 
outcome for public goods. On the other hand, the theory says nothing 
about the income redistribution which results from the private bargains 
made by the winning candidate to individuals and groups on the road 
to election. A crucial question for scholars of democratic choice is 
whether the voting process is important when the institution Government 
becomes such a major factor in our lives. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. In spatial theory, the citizen's utility for a candidate at e 
is a decreasing function of II e - x(c) 11. the Euclidean distance 
between e and the voter's ideal point (Davis and Hinich [7]. 
For a review of spatial theory, see Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 
[8 ]. 
2. See the analysis of the 1968 election survey by Converse, et al 
[5 ]. The 1972 election survey is discussed by Miller, et al [15]. 
3. The connection between issues and dimensions is discussed in the 
spatial analysis of the candidate feeling thermometer scores 
from the 1968 election survey by Cahoon, Hinich, and Ordeshook 
[4]. Also see Rabinowitz [16]. 
4. See Arrow's [2] elegant reformulation of single peaked preferences 
and majority rule social choice of Black [3 ]. 
5. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given by Davis, DeGroot, 
and Hinich [ 6]. 
6. See McKelvey and Ordeshook [13 ]. 
7. See Hinich, et al [12 ]. McKelvey [14] generalizes these results 
and a.11;10 JD.Ost .of the Davis�Hinich spatial results. 
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8. Since the electorate is a random sample from an infinitive 
population with a given probability measure, the "parameters" 
a1, a2, x, and A are random variables whose joint distribution 
is of primary interest even though it depends on the underlying 
measure. 
9. A comparison of equilibria under different candidate objective 
functions, including expected plurality, is given by Aranson, 
Hinich, and Ordeshook [l]. 
10. See Friedman [11). 
11. See Riker and Ordeshook [17], and Ferejohn and Fiorina [10]. 
12. The'net utility for citizen c is the utility of the resources 
derived as a result of candidate 8 winning and recognizing the 
r1 contribution
, minus the total contribution r1 + r2, which 
will be exactly r if there is no saturation. Since r will 
go to zero, the assumption of no saturation is easily met. 
Moreover in the limit the net is irrelevant, and the slope of 
the utility function which appears in the model becomes the 
marginal utility of voting for e given he wins. 
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